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Oligopolistic competition in the banking sector and risk in the real economy are important
characteristics of developed economies, but have so far mostly been abstracted from in monetary
economics. We build a dynamic general equilibrium model of monetary policy transmission that
incorporates both of these features and document that including them leads to important insights
in our understanding of the transmission mechanism. Various equilibrium cases can occur, and
policies have differing effects in these cases. We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy in
2016-2019 in order to study how changes in the degree of banking competition or the policy rate
would have affected equilibrium outcomes. We find that doubling banking competition would
have increased welfare by 1.02%, but at the cost of increasing the probability of bank default
from 0.02% to 0.44%. We further find that the policy rate was set optimally to minimize the
probability of bank default, but that a decrease in the policy rate by 1pp would have increased
welfare by 0.40%. We also show that bank profits are increasing in the policy rate, in particular
when interest rates are low. Thus, a 1pp reduction in the policy rate would have reduced profits
per bank by 35.5% in our calibrated economy. Finally, we document that monetary policy pass-
through is incomplete under imperfect competition in the banking sector, as a change in the
policy rate by 1pp leads to a change of only 0.92pp in the loan rate, while pass-through to the
deposit rate is nearly complete for rate increases, but almost zero for rate reductions due to the
zero-lower bound.
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After the financial crisis of 2007-2009, economists have started to take the role of the financial
system in the transmission of monetary policy seriously, as they recognized that the actions of
banks and other institutions have important effects on how central banks can influence the real
economy. However, most studies in monetary economics assume a perfectly competitive banking
sector, and many abstract from risk in the real economy. As we document in Section 2, the banking
sector in developed economies including the U.S. is clearly characterized by imperfect competition.
In our opinion, modelling the banking sector accordingly is highly relevant to understand the
transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. On the one hand, we need to understand
how the presence of imperfect competition in the banking sector affects, and potentially limits,
the transmission of monetary policy, for example through incomplete pass-through from policy
rates to loan and deposit rates. On the other hand, only in a model with imperfect competition
in the banking sector (and risk in the real economy) can we study how monetary policy affects
bank profits and the probability of bank default - with especially the latter being at the center of
attention for policymakers after the financial crisis. In this paper, we build on existing research
to create a model of monetary policy transmission that includes oligopolistic competition in the
banking sector, and both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk in the real economy. We then calibrate
the model to the U.S. economy in 2016-2019. Based on the calibration, we discuss how changes
in the degree of competition and in the policy rate would have affected macroeconomic outcomes
during that period.
Our model shows that taking the banking system’s role in monetary policy transmission and
the competitive structure in the banking sector seriously is pertinent to understand how central
banks can affect the real economy. We document that the economy can be in various equilibrium
cases depending on parameters, and that this matters for the transmission of monetary policy:
for example, banks react differently to policy changes when the deposit rate is at the zero-lower
bound compared to when it is not, or when the reserve requirement does or does not bind. We
derive comparative statics regarding the number of banks, the supply of bonds, the interest on
reserves, the reserve and the capital requirement in all equilibrium cases, and document how some
of these can go in opposite directions or have no effects depending on which equilibrium case the
economy is in. These results show that we need to calibrate the model in order to understand
how monetary policy affects outcomes in a particular economy and during a particular time. To
this end, we calibrate our model to the U.S. economy in 2016-2019 by matching several moments
from the data, and study several counterfactuals in the calibrated economy. We find that doubling
banking competition during that time period would have increased expected welfare by 1.02%, but
also increased the probability of bank default from 0.02% to 0.44%, while halving the degree of
competition would have reduced welfare by 1.52% and the probability of bank default by 0.018pp.
We also find that the Fed set the policy rate optimally to minimize the probability of bank default,
since changes in the policy rate in either direction would have increased the probability of bank
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default. Policy was not set optimally in terms of welfare, however, as a decrease in the policy
rate by 1pp would have led to an increase in aggregate welfare by 0.40%. Further, we find that
bank profits are increasing in the policy rate, and particularly so when the deposit rate is equal
to zero. Since the deposit rate was very close to zero in the U.S. during our calibration period, a
decrease in the policy rate by 1pp would have lowered profit per bank by 35.5%, while an increase
by 1pp would have led to only a moderate increase in profits by 1.23%. Finally, we document
that monetary policy pass-through is incomplete under imperfect competition: In our calibrated
economy, an increase in the policy rate by 1pp increases loan rates by only 0.92%, and deposit rates
by 0.99%. Due to the zero-lower bound, a decrease in the policy rate by 1pp leads to a decrease
of only 0.06pp in deposit rates, while the loan rate decreases by 0.92pp. If the degree of banking
competition is halved, pass-through to loan rates reduces further to 0.89pp, while pass-through
to deposit rates vanishes completely as lower banking competition keeps the deposit rate at the
zero-lower bound even after a 1pp increase in the policy rate.
Model and calibration summary. Our model is based on the Lagos and Wright (2005)
framework, and includes banks that perform liquidity transformation as in Altermatt (2019) or
Keister and Sanches (2019). We introduce competition à la Cournot in the banking sector and a
risk-return trade-off for entrepreneurs as in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010). Each period is
divided into a DM and a CM, and the economy is populated by three types of agents: households,
banks, and entrepreneurs. In the DM, households meet with each other and there are gains from
trade, but due to anonymity and limited commitment, households need liquid assets to complete
trades. Following Williamson (2012), we assume that some meetings are unmonitored and only cash
is accepted as payment, while others are monitored and bank deposits are accepted in addition to
cash. In the CM, entrepreneurs are the unique agents that have investment opportunities. If an
entrepreneur invests, she faces a risk-return trade-off: she can choose a project with a high success
rate but a low payoff, or one with low success rate but a high payoff. The quality of the project
is heterogeneous across entrepreneurs. Specifically, an entrepreneur with a better project either
receives a higher return given the success rate, or has a higher success rate given the project return.
There is also aggregate risk, which affects the default probability of all entrepreneurs.
Because entrepreneurs have no funds of their own, they need to borrow from other agents. We
assume banks are the unique agents that can enforce loans made to entrepreneurs. Banks can fund
their lending either by sweat equity or by issuing deposits. We assume that there is a fixed number
of banks, and banks compete à la Cournot for loans and deposits, meaning that they have market
power over the interest rates on loans and deposits, and they make profits in equilibrium. Besides
lending to entrepreneurs, banks can also purchase government bonds or hold reserves. Banks are
subject to reserve and capital requirements set by the government. After the DM has taken place,
entrepreneurs with successful investment projects repay their loans and consume the remaining
profits, and banks repay their depositors, consume their remaining profits, and are then replaced
by a new set of banks. While banks can fully protect themselves against the idiosyncratic risk
choices of entrepreneurs through diversification, the aggregate shock introduces the possibility of
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bank default. If banks default, i.e. if the value of their assets is less than their outstanding deposits,
their remaining assets are distributed to depositors by the government.
We find that the equilibrium can be divided in three different cases, depending on parameters.
In Case I, banks are indifferent about raising additional equity, as the marginal cost of deposits
equals the marginal cost of equity. Thus, the capital requirement is non-binding. Case I occurs when
the demand for deposits by households is low relative to the demand for loans by entrepreneurs and
the supply of government bonds. In Case II, the deposit rate is above the zero-lower bound, but the
marginal cost of raising deposits lies strictly below the marginal cost of raising equity. Thus, banks
prefer funding themselves with deposits over equity, so the capital requirement binds. Finally, Case
III is characterized by the deposit rate being at the zero-lower bound. This case occurs when the
demand for deposits by households is large relative to the demand for loans by entrepreneurs and
the supply of government bonds.1 In both Cases II and III, the reserve requirement may or may
not bind, while it is always binding in case I.
As already mentioned above, the effects of changes in variables such as the number of banks,
the interest rate on reserves, or the reserve requirement differ across these equilibrium cases, and
sometimes they are ambiguous even within an equilibrium case, particularly in terms of their effect
on the probability of bank default. We therefore calibrate the model to U.S. data from 2016-
2019. To calibrate the model, we first directly set the discount factor, the inflation rate, the
share of monitored meetings, the interest on reserves, the reserve and the capital requirement to
match the data. We then follow Rocheteau et al. (2018) by matching the semi-elasticity of money
demand in the model to the data. To do so, we use data from 1959-2007 since we need longer time
series to calibrate money demand. We then jointly calibrate the number of banks, the supply of
bonds, two parameters regarding the risk-return trade-off faced by entrepreneurs, and the share
of entrepreneurs relative to households, by matching the expected return on loans, the expected
deposit rate, the reserve-to-loan ratio, the loan default probability, and the loans-to-GDP ratio from
the data. Finally, we assume a truncated normal distribution for the aggregate shock to the default
probability of entrepreneurs, set the mean to one and calibrate the standard deviation such that the
expected probability of bank default matches the ratio of bank failure cost to total transnational
deposits. Even though our model is highly non-linear, we are able to match all parameters very
precisely.
Existing literature. The New Monetarist literature based on Lagos and Wright (2005) provides
an excellent framework to study the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. Within
this literature, the first paper to take the role of banks into account is Berentsen et al. (2007). In
this paper, perfectly competitive banks intermediate liquid assets from agents that do not want to
consume during the DM to agents that want to consume. Another early paper including banks
in this literature is He et al. (2008), where there is a risk of cash being stolen, and thus agents
might prefer to deposit their money at a bank and use bank liabilities to make payments instead.
1Naturally, Case II is an intermediate case between Cases I and III in terms of the demand for deposits by
households relative to the demand for loans by entrepreneurs and the supply of government bonds.
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In Williamson (2012), agents can use interest-bearing bonds to pay in some DM meetings, whereas
they can only use fiat money in others. This creates a role for banks as they are able to insure
agents against this uncertainty. The bank holds a portfolio of bonds and fiat money, and allows
agents that need fiat money to withdraw it. In Gu et al. (2013), banks arise endogenously if
limited commitment issues between agents make credit arrangements infeasible. Gu et al. (2019)
show, using a variety of different models, that banking is inherently unstable. Imhof et al. (2018)
analyse how liquidity requirements affect risk-taking by banks and the quantity of deposits created.
Altermatt (2019) studies how monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy in a model where
perfectly competitive banks perform liquidity creation by investing in illiquid assets such as loans
to entrepreneurs and bonds and issue liquid assets. Keister and Sanches (2019) study how the
introduction of central bank digital currencies affects outcomes in a model where banks perform a
similar role. Chiu et al. (2019) extend this model by giving banks market power on the liabilities’
side, and show that the introduction of central bank digital currencies can be welfare improving if it
reduces banks’ market power. Dong et al. (2017) was the first paper to study oligopolistic banking
competition in this literature, but in their model, banks do not create liquid assets and extend
loans to entrepreneurs as in our paper. Instead, they intermediate funds as in Berentsen et al.
(2007). Head et al. (2021) also incorporate imperfect banking competition into the framework from
Berentsen et al. (2007) by modelling the banking sector in the vein of Burdett and Judd (1983).
Aït Lahcen and Gomis-Porqueras (2021) model banks as in Berentsen et al. (2007) and add an
idiosyncratic cost of accessing the bank to study endogenous financial inclusion. Andolfatto et al.
(2019) integrate banks a la Diamond (1997) in a New Monetarist framework and show that nominal
deposit contracts combined with a central bank acting as a lender of last resort allow for efficient
liquidity insurance and a panic-free banking system.
In the broader literature on macroeconomics, Gertler and Karadi (2011) is an important
paper on the transmission of monetary policy through the financial system. In this paper, an
agency problem between banks and their depositors leads to endogenous constraints on the banks’
leverage ratios. Curdia andWoodford (2009) is another paper that integrates a banking sector into a
quantitative macroeconomic model. In Gertler et al. (2012), banks can choose to finance themselves
through equity or short term debt, so bank risk exposure arises endogenously. The authors use the
model to assess quantitatively how perceptions of fundamental risk and of government credit policy
in a crisis affect the vulnerability of the financial system ex ante. Meanwhile, Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2015) studies bank runs in an economy with liquidity mismatch. Bianchi and Bigio (2017) develop
a tractable model of banks’ liquidity management and the credit channel of monetary policy. In
their model, banks are heterogeneous, but perfectly competitive, and they bargain on the interbank
market over reserves.
While imperfect banking competition has largely been abstracted from macroeconomic models
on monetary policy transmission, it has been studied in microeconomic models of banking. Keeley
(1990) is an early example of a theoretical framework on the relationship of banking competition
and financial stability. The paper argues that a reduction in charter value and monopoly rents for
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banks leads to an increase in bank defaults due to an agency problem. However, Allen and Gale
(2004b) show that with incomplete markets, the efficiency gains from increased competition in the
banking sector outweigh the losses resulting from a financial crisis, so even though eliminating
bank defaults is possible, they occur in the constrained-efficient equilibrium. In Allen and Gale
(2004a), the authors point out that it is not obvious that an increase in banking competition leads
to less financial stability, and study a number of frameworks where this is not the case. Similarly,
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) argue that lower competition on loan markets increases lending rates,
which then leads borrowers to take on riskier investments. In turn, this increases the risk of both
borrower and bank defaults. Due to these countervailing forces, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010)
argue that the relationship between competition and bank failure is U-shaped. Instead of reducing
competition, another way to limit the agency problem is to enforce capital requirements on banks.
While Marshall and Prescott (2001) show that capital requirements can indeed limit the agency
problem, Hellmann et al. (2000) argue that such capital requirements can lead to Pareto-inefficient
outcomes, as they also reduce the banks’ franchise value and thus incentivize banks to take on more
risk. Repullo (2004) shows that risk-based capital requirements can be used to effectively control
risk-shifting incentives. Kashyap et al. (2020) study optimal banking regulation in the presence
of credit and run-risk, and show that banks rely more on deposit funding than is optimal without
regulation, while bank lending can be higher or lower than a planner would want. While we focus on
symmetric equilibria with equally-sized banks, Corbae and D’Erasmo (2021) study how regulatory
policies affect bank failure rates as well as lending and interest rates in a model with an endogenous
size distribution of banks.
Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 documents data facts on
competition in the banking sector. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 discusses the equilibrium,
and Section 5 analyses the comparative statics of some key variables. Section 6 describes the
calibration strategy and discusses the calibrated economy. Section 7 discusses the counterfactuals.
Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Data Facts on Banking Competition
In many countries, the majority of the assets in the banking sector are controlled by a few large
banks. Figure 1 plots the percentages of all bank assets owned by top 5 banks of selected countries
in 2017. The figure shows that the concentration in the banking industry ranges from 46 % (U.S.)
to 97 % (Finland). When looking at the top 10 banks, this number increases even further, in
particular for the U.S., where the asset share of the top 5 banks is somewhat moderate. The degree
of concentration at a few large banks is not a recent phenomenon either, and it is also not limited to
developed economies: Figure 2 shows the degree of concentration for countries with different income



































































Source: World Bank Global Financial Development Database.
Figure 1: Percentages of Bank Assets Held by Top 5 Banks in 2017.























Source: World Bank Global Financial Development Database.
Figure 2: Average Percentages of Bank Assets Held by Top 5 Banks.
While the documented concentration of assets among a few large banks hints towards market
power of banks, it is no perfect evidence by itself. Perhaps the threat of entry by new contestants is
enough to ensure that banks behave in competitive manner, while economies of scale could explain
why concentration of assets is so high. However, there is both anecdotal and quantitative evidence
that this is not the case, at least for the U.S. Figure 3 shows the interest rate on excess reserves and
the average deposit rate earned on checking deposits worth less than $100,000 from January 2010
until December 2019. Since reserves at the central bank are a perfectly safe asset for banks, the
difference between the interest rates on reserves and deposits is a risk-free profit margin for banks.
Conversely, this profit opportunity should attract new entrants that offer deposits at a higher rate
than existing banks, thereby forcing them to also increase the interest paid on their deposits. In
fact, this is exactly what TNB U.S.A Inc. was planning to do, but the Federal Reserve has refused
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to open a reserve account for TNB, thereby basically denying them entry into the banking market.2






2.5% Interest on excess reserves
Interest on non-jumbo deposits
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
Figure 3: Interest on excess reserves and interest on non-jumbo deposits for the U.S.
Given these observations, we conclude that the banking market in developed economies, and in
particular in the U.S., is characterized by imperfect competition, and that there is an opportunity
for existing players in the market to earn oligopoly rents.
3 The Model
3.1 Physical Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. Every period is divided into two subperiods: the DM (the
decentralized market) and the CM (the centralized market). There is a measure two of infinitely-
lived households, divided equally into buyers and sellers. In the DM, buyers consume a DM good
that can only be produced by sellers. In the CM, sellers consume a CM good that can be produced
by all agents. The CM good also serves as the numéraire. Both DM and CM goods are perishable
and cannot be stored across periods. A buyer’s instantaneous utility is given by
u(qt)− lt (3.1)
where qt ≥ 0 is the consumption of the DM good and lt is the labor supplied in the CM. We assume
u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0, and −qu′′(q)/u′(q) < 1.3 A seller’s instantaneous utility is given by
xt − ht, (3.2)
2For more on this, see e.g. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-08/the-fed-versus-the-
\narrow-bank.
3The assumption −qu′′(q)/u′(q) < 1 ensures that demand for deposits is increasing in the deposit interest rate,
which is generally observed in the data. The assumption is standard in papers on monetary policy and banking; see
e.g., Williamson (2012).
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where xt is the consumption of the CM good and ht is the labor supplied in the DM. We assume
that by using one unit of labor, sellers can produce one unit of the DM good, and all agents can
produce one unit of the CM good. All households share the same discount factor β. We assume
there is no discounting between subperiods.
Each period starts with the DM. At the beginning of the DM, a buyer is matched with a
seller with probability one, and buyers make take-it-or-leave it offers to sellers.4 Because buyers
and sellers are anonymous in the DM, credit arrangements are not possible and a medium of
exchange is necessary. Following Williamson (2012), we assume that a fraction 1−η of the meetings
are unmonitored, which means buyers can only use cash as payment. The remaining meetings
are monitored, which means buyers can pay with either cash or bank deposits. Differing from
Williamson (2012), we assume that buyers learn the type of meeting they will be in during the next
DM at the beginning of the previous CM, so there is no uncertainty regarding payments.
In addition to households, there is also measure S of entrepreneurs who only live for one period.
Each entrepreneur is born in the CM of period t and is endowed with a project that can produce
CM goods in the CM of period t + 1. Each project requires one unit of capital investment, which
can be converted from one unit of the CM good. Before the production begins, each entrepreneur
must choose a production technology. The production technology is represented by R ∈ (0, Ri]
where Ri is specific to entrepreneur i. The output given Ri, the entrepreneur’s choice of R, and an
aggregate shock s, is
y(R,Ri, s) =
0 with probability p(R,R
i, s),
R with probability 1− p(R,Ri, s).
(3.3)
In words, expression (3.3) says that if an entrepreneur chooses R, the production will yield R with
probability 1 − p(R,Ri, s) and 0 otherwise. We assume that p(R,Ri, s) is increasing in R and s
and is decreasing in Ri. Conditional on s, the realization of y(R,Ri, s) is independent across all
entrepreneurs. Note that Ri can be interpreted as an entrepreneur’s innate ability. An entrepreneur
with a larger Ri can choose a technology with higher potential yield and is more likely to succeed
for any given R and s. We assume Ri is determined when an entrepreneur is born and follows a
distribution on [0, R̄] characterized by the CDF F (·) and PDF f(·). The aggregate shock s follows
a distribution on [s, s̄] characterized by the CDF G(·). Finally, after production, capital fully
depreciates. Entrepreneurs only consume in the second CM of their lives, and they derive linear
utility from consuming the CM good.
The economy also contains N banks that are born in the CM of period t and dissolve in the
CM of period t+1. Unlike buyers, banks can commit to their liabilities, and therefore bank deposits
4Lagos and Wright (2005) explore the role of different bargaining powers, and Rocheteau and Wright (2005)
explore the role of different trading protocols in similar models. We assume take-it-or-leave it offers in order not to
complicate the model further, but our results are robust to other specifications, and the findings from the two papers
mentioned regarding how different setups in the DM affect outcomes generally apply here as well.
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are accepted as payment in the DM. Because entrepreneurs are not endowed with any CM good
and they cannot work in the CM, they must borrow from other agents in the economy in order to
invest. We assume banks can costlessly verify entrepreneurs’ output in the CM while the cost for
households is infinite.5 Hence, entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. We assume banks can
work in the CM using the same technology as buyers, and working generates linear disutility. This
can be interpreted as giving banks the option to raise sweat equity. Alternatively, banks can fund
their lending by issuing deposits. Banks receive linear utility from consuming during the second
CM of their existence, and they discount at rate β between periods. Banks compete à la Cournot
in both the loan market and the deposit market. Deposits can be transferred to other agents in
the DM, and in the next CM they can be redeemed (with interest) for the consumption good.
The economic activities in the CM are as follows. At the beginning of the CM, entrepreneurs
born in the last period settle their debt with banks and consume. Then banks settle their debt
with households and consume. We assume that both entrepreneurs and banks are subject to limited
liability. That is, they can default on their liabilities if their net worth is negative. If an entrepreneur
declares bankruptcy, a bank can seize the entrepreneur’s assets. If a bank defaults on its deposit
liabilities, a government will seize the bank’s assets and distribute them to its creditors. Finally,
after old generations of entrepreneurs and banks consume, they are replaced with a new set of
entrepreneurs and banks.
The government in the model economy controls the supply of fiat money and issues a one-
period nominal bond. LetMHt andMBt denote the amount of money held by households and banks
(i.e., reserves) in period t, respectively. We assume the total money supply grows at net rate µ, i.e.,
MHt+1 +MBt+1 = (1 +µ)(MHt +MBt ). We also assume that the government pays interest on reserves
held by banks. Denote the nominal interest on reserves as iR. Each unit of government bonds pays
1 + iBt units of money in the CM of period t. Let Bt denote the government bonds outstanding in
period t. We assume government bonds cannot be used as payment in the DM.6 The government
also collects a lump-sum tax τt from households. The government’s budget constraint is
φt(MHt +MBt +Bt) + τt = φt(MHt−1 + (1 + iRt )MBt−1 + (1 + iBt )Bt−1) (3.4)
where φt is the price of money in terms of CM good. We define rBt =
φt(1+iBt )
φt−1
to be the gross real
interest rate on government bonds.
3.2 Household’s Problems in the DM and CM
In what follows, we restrict our attention to stationary equilibria, which implies φtφt+1 = 1 + µ and
rB = 1+iB1+µ . Now, let a denote the amount of real assets a buyer has at the beginning of the DM.
5Alternatively, one may assume costly state verification à la Diamond (1984), and Williamson (1986). However,
since we mainly focus on the oligopolistic banking competition, we assume the cost of verification for banks is zero.
6For example, government bonds may not be recognizable by sellers in the DM.
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As is standard in models following Lagos and Wright (2005), the households’ value function in the
CM is linear in their real wealth at the end of the DM. Hence, buyers solve
max
q
u(q)− q s.t. q ≤ a. (3.5)
Let q(a) denote the buyer’s consumption in the DM. Then q = min{a, q∗}, where u′(q∗) = 1.
Next, we turn to the CM. Let rD denote the expected gross real deposit rate. Note that
in a stationary equilibrium, the return on fiat money is equal to 1/(1 + µ). Let z and d denote
the amount of real fiat money balances and bank deposits a monitored buyer chooses to carry.







+ u(qd) + z1 + µ + r
Dd− qd (3.6)
s.t. qd = min
{
z




Monitored buyers will carry fiat money if and only if 1/(1+µ) ≥ rD. Monitored buyers will exhaust
their money and deposits in the DM (i.e. qd = z/(1 +µ) + rDd) unless max{1/(1 +µ), rD} ≥ 1/β.7
Note that because government bonds cannot be used as payment in the DM, buyers will hold bonds
if and only if rB ≥ 1/β. Similarly, sellers will hold money, bank deposits and government bonds if





+ u(qm) + z̃1 + µ − q
m (3.8)
s.t. qm = min
{
z̃




Similar to monitored buyers, unmonitored buyers will hold bonds if and only if rB ≥ 1/β. Since
they cannot use deposits in the DM, they will also only hold deposits if rD ≥ 1/β. Finally, they will
exhaust their money holdings unless 1/(1 +µ) ≥ 1/β. We denote the total demand for government
bonds from households as bH .
3.3 Entrepreneur’s Problem in the CM
Let rL denote the gross real lending rate. First, entrepreneurs choose the production technology
by maximising their expected value from producing, given the loan rate and their technology:
v(rL, Ri) = max
R
E{[1− p(R,Ri, s)](R− rL)}, (3.10)
7In other words, monitored buyers carry fiat money only if the nominal rate on deposits is negative, and they
exhaust their liquid assets in the DM unless the economy is at the Friedman rule (1 +µ = β), or the real deposit rate
fully compensates for discounting (rD = 1/β).
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where the expectation is taken over s. In words, (3.10) says that with probability 1 − p(R,Ri, s),
the entrepreneur succeeds, and her surplus after repaying the loan is R−rL. It is clear that as long
as rL > 0, entrepreneurs default if and only if their projects fail. Now, define
p(R,Ri) = E[p(R,Ri, s)], (3.11)
and let R∗(rL, Ri) denote the solution. Then
1− p(R∗(rL, Ri), Ri)− pR(R∗(rL, Ri), Ri)(R∗(rL, Ri)− rL) ≥ 0, (3.12)
with equality when R∗(rL, Ri) ∈ (0, Ri). Note that entrepreneurs will never choose R = 0. Now,
suppose pRR(·) ≥ 0. Then, there exists a unique solution as long as Ri ≥ rL, and R∗(rL, rL) = rL.
Furthermore, under this assumption, R∗(rL, Ri) is increasing in rL and Ri. Finally, let
v(rL, Ri) = [1− p(R∗(rL, Ri), Ri)](R∗(rL, Ri)− rL). (3.13)
It is clear that v(rL, Ri) is decreasing in rL. Hence, entrepreneurs are willing to invest in projects
(i.e., v(rL, Ri) ≥ 0) if and only if Ri ≥ rL.
3.4 Bank’s Problem in the CM
Since only entrepreneurs with Ri ≥ rL borrow from banks, the demand for loans is decreasing in
rL and is given by
L(rL) = S[1− F (rL)]. (3.14)
Total demand for deposits D(rD) is increasing in rD and given by
D(rD) =







/rD, if 11+µ ≤ r
D < 1/β;
≥ βηq∗, if rD ≥ 1/β.
(3.15)
Conditional on s, the expected probability of default on loans is
P (rL, s) = 11− F (rL)
∫ R̄
rL
p(R∗(rL, Ri), Ri, s)f(Ri) dRi. (3.16)
Note that with the aggregate shock, banks may default in equilibrium. Specifically, let lj and
dj denote the quantities of loans and deposits originated from bank j. Let zj and bj denote the
quantities of reserves and government bonds held by bank j. Recall that iR is the nominal interest
rate on reserves. Let r̃D denote the deposit rate a bank pays if it does not default. Under limited
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liability, banks default if and only if
ljr
L[1− P (rL, s)] + zj(1 + i
R)
1 + µ + bjr
B < dj r̃
D, (3.17)
i.e., if the return on their assets is less than the redemption value of deposits. It is important to




min{ljrL[1− P (rL, s)] + zj(1 + iR)1 + µ + bjrB, dj r̃D
} , (3.18)
where the expectation is taken over s. Banks’ expected payoff in the CM is equal to
E
max{ljrL[1− P (rL, s)] + zj(1 + iR)1 + µ + bjrB − dj r̃D, 0
} . (3.19)
Note that if we add up (3.18) and (3.19), we get
djr
D + E





L[1− P (rL, s)] + zj(1 + i
R)
1 + µ + bjr
B
]
= ljrL[1− P (rL)] +
zj(1 + iR)
1 + µ + bjr
B,
where P (rL) = E[P (rL, s)]. Now, let ej the amount of equity raised by bank j. Let rL(L) and
rD(D) be the inverse demand functions for loans and deposits. Bank j solves
max
dj≥0,ej≥0,zj≥0,bj≥0
Πj = −ej + β
[
ljr
L(L)[1− P (rL(L))] + zj(1 + i
R)




s.t. lj = dj + ej − zj − bj , (3.21)
ej ≥ γlj , (3.22)
zj ≥ δdj , (3.23)
with L = lj +
∑
j′ 6=j lj′ and D = dj +
∑
j′ 6=j dj′ . Constraints (3.22) and (3.23) represent capital and
reserve requirements on banks, respectively. Bank j takes the other banks’ choices as given when
choosing lj and dj . We focus our attention on symmetric solutions where lj and dj are the same
for all j. Now, define H(L) = rL(L)[1 − P (rL(L))], the expected return per unit of loan. Let ζ
and κ be the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (3.22) and (3.23), respectively. The first order
conditions w.r.t. zj , bj , dj , and ej are given by the following.
ljH
′(L) +H(L) = 1 + i
R
1 + µ + ζγ + κ; (3.24)
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ljH
′(L) +H(L) = rB + ζγ; (3.25)
ljH
′(L) +H(L) = rD(D) + djrD′(D) + ζγ + κδ; (3.26)
ljH
′(L) +H(L) = 1
β
− ζ(1− γ). (3.27)




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + z
B(1 + iR)
1 + µ + b
BrB, (3.28)
where zB and bB are the total reserves and government bonds held by banks, respectively. Note
that the right-hand side of (3.28) is decreasing in ŝ. Hence, ŝ is unique, and the probability of bank
default in equilibrium is Ψ = 1−G(ŝ). Note that in a symmetric equilibrium, either all banks fail
or no banks fail.
4 Equilibrium
We restrict our attention to stationary equilibria. Recall the quantity of government bonds held by
a household is bH , and the total supply of government bonds is b. Below we define the equilibrium.
Definition 4.1 A stationary and symmetric equilibrium consists of the quantity of bank loans L,
the quantity of deposits D, the quantity of equity raised E, the quantity of reserves held by banks
zB, the quantity of government bonds held by banks bB, the quantity of government bonds held by
households bH , a loan rate rL, a deposit rate rD and a government bond rate rB such that
(1) L, D, E, zB, and bB solve the first order conditions (3.24) - (3.27) with dj = D/N , ej = E/N ,
lj = L/N , zj = zB/N , and bj = bB/N for all j;
(2) rL is given by (3.14) and rD is given by (3.15);
(3) rB clears the bond market: 2bH + bB = b.
The next proposition shows the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1 Assume that H ′(L) < 0 and H ′′(L) < 0 for all L ∈ [0, S], and that rD′(D) > 0
and rD′′(D) ≥ 0 for all D ≥ 0. Then, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof: see Appendix B.1.
Since the equilibrium conditions are characterized by a number of inequalities that may or
may not hold in equilibrium, we find it convenient to distinguish different equilibrium cases that
can occur. In the following, we will discuss these cases separately.
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4.1 Case I
Suppose that rB = 1/β. In this case, the capital requirement (3.23) does not bind because the cost
of raising equity is equal to the return from government bonds. Thus, we have
L
N
H ′(L) +H(L) = 1
β
. (4.1)
As long as 1+iR1+µ <
1
β , the reserve requirement (3.22) binds in this case. Hence, D is given by
rD(D) + D
N
rD′(D) = 1− δ
β
+ δ(1 + i
R)
1 + µ . (4.2)
Then, we have zB = δD and E ∈ [γL,∞). Finally, we have bB = E + D − L − zB. Such an
equilibrium exists if the above conditions hold for rD(D) ≥ 11+µ and b
B < b.
Case I is characterized by high returns on assets and high costs of liabilities. This implies that
this case occurs if the supply of high-return assets is abundant relative to the demand for loans.
Thus, banks are willing to pay high interest rates on deposits in order to fund the investment
opportunities, and they opt to raise some sweat equity in order to avoid increasing the marginal
cost of deposits by too much.
4.2 Case II
Suppose now that rB < 1/β. In this case, bonds are only held by banks. In addition, the capital
requirement (3.23) binds, but the reserve requirement may or may not bind.
First, suppose the reserve requirement binds. Then, we have D = ((1−γ)L+b)/(1−δ). From
(3.24) - (3.27), we can derive the following expression for L:
L
N
H ′(L) +H(L) + (1− γ)δ(1 + i
R)











Note that L is given by this expression only if rD(D) ≥ 11+µ and r
B ≥ 1+iR1+µ , where






− γ(1− γ)β . (4.4)
We denote this scenario as Case IIA. To understand (4.4), first note that it can be rewritten as
L
N
H ′(L) +H(L) = (1− γ)rB + γ
β
. (4.5)
The left-hand side is the marginal benefit of issuing one more unit of loans, while the right-hand
side is the opportunity cost. Specifically, instead of issuing one more unit of loans, the bank could
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have saved γ units of labour in the CM (because a proportion γ of the loans must be funded through
equity) and invest in 1− γ units of government bonds.
If the amount of L that satisfies (4.3) is such that that the right-hand side of (4.4) is smaller
than 1+iR1+µ , then the reserve requirement no longer binds and banks may hold excess reserves in
equilibrium. In this case, we have
rD(D) + D
N
rD′(D) = 1 + i
R









= 1 + i
R
1 + µ +
γ
(1− γ)β . (4.7)
The bond rate is now given by rB = 1+iR1+µ . Note thatD and L are given by the above two expressions
only if rD(D) ≥ 11+µ . We denote this scenario as Case IIB.
Case II is characterized by both the bond rate and the deposit rate being away from their
upper and lower bounds, respectively. Thus, the marginal cost of deposits has to equal the marginal
return on loans in this case. In case IIA, the bond interest rate can be interpreted as the policy
rate by which the monetary authority can affect equilibrium outcomes (the monetary authority can
change rB through open-market operations, which we will discuss in the next section), while in case
IIB, the interest rate on reserves can be interpreted as the policy rate, as the monetary authority
can affect equilibrium outcomes by varying iR.
4.3 Case III
Case III is characterized by rD(D) = 11+µ . In equilibrium, r
D(D) < 11+µ is not possible because
buyers will hold case instead. Therefore, rD(D) is bounded below by 11+µ , i.e., the zero lower
bound. For rD(D) = 11+µ , fiat money and deposits are perfect substitutes for monitored buyers,
which implies that the demand for deposits does not have a unique solution. However, in such case,






(1 + µ). (4.8)
If D = D′, the marginal cost of increasing the amount of deposits is given by rD(D) + DN r
D′(D),
but for any D < D′, the marginal cost of increasing D is given by rD(D) = 11+µ , as varying the
amount of deposits does not affect the deposit interest rate. Since DN r
D′(D) is strictly positive, this
leads to a jump in the marginal cost of deposits at D′. Therefore, (3.24) - (3.27) become
ljH
′(L) +H(L) = 1 + i
R
1 + µ + ζγ + κ; (4.9)
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ljH
′(L) +H(L) = rB + ζγ; (4.10)
ljH
′(L) +H(L) ≥ 11 + µ + ζγ + κδ; (4.11)
ljH
′(L) +H(L) = 1
β
− ζ(1− γ). (4.12)
In particular, the equality in (3.26) is replaced with an inequality in (4.11).
To solve the equilibrium in this case, first suppose that the inequality in (4.11) is strict. Then
D = D′. If the reserve requirement binds, we have (1− γ)L = (1− δ)D′ − b, and






− γ(1− γ)β . (4.13)
Such an equilibrium exists only if rB > 1+iR1+µ . We denote this scenario as Case IIIA. If the reserve








= 1 + i
R
1 + µ +
γ
(1− γ)β . (4.14)
Such an equilibrium exists only if iR > 0. We denote this scenario as Case IIIB. Finally, assume
the equality in (4.11) holds. Note that the only way for both (4.9) and (4.11) to hold in this scenario








= 11 + µ +
γ
(1− γ)β . (4.15)
We also classify this scenario as Case IIIB.
Case III is characterized by low returns on assets and low costs of liabilities. This implies that
such case occurs when good investment opportunities are scarce relative to the demand for deposits.
Thus, banks are willing to lend to entrepreneurs at low interest rates, since the funding they receive
from depositors is abundant. Similar to Case II, Case III is separated into A and B versions, where
rB should be interpreted as the policy rate in Case IIIA and iR should be interpreted as the policy
rate in Case IIIB.
5 Comparative Statics
Before discussing the calibration of the model, we first want to present the comparative statics of
five key variables. As will become clear in this section, these comparative statics vary quite a bit
across the different equilibrium cases. In our opinion, this underlines the importance of developing
a serious model that is able to identify various corner solutions that exist before analyzing the
effects of various policies empirically. The five variables we analyze here are: the number of banks
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N , the supply of government bonds b, the interest on reserves iR, the reserve requirement δ, and
the capital requirement γ. Except for N , these variables can be directly set by the government,
and N might be influenced indirectly through policy. We focus on the effects of policy changes on























LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + z
B(1 + iR)
1 + µ + b
BrB. (5.2)
Note that the deposit rate rD is always increasing inD and the loan rate rL is always decreasing
in L, so we focus on government bond rate rB when discussing interest rate changes in the economy.
Also, recall that in Case I, banks are indifferent between raising more equity and purchasing more
government bonds (bB). As a result, bank default probability is not well-defined. Hence, we focus
on Case IIA, IIB, IIIA, and IIIB when discussing bank default probability.
5.1 Increasing the Number of Banks N
First, we analyze how the number of banks affects equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 5.1 Consider an increase in N .
(1) L will increase in all cases except for Case IIIA.
(2) D will increase in all cases except for Case IIIA and IIIB.
(3) rB remains unchanged in Case I, IIB, and IIIB. In Case IIA, rB may increase or decrease. In
Case IIIA, rB will increase.
(4) Π will decrease in Case I, IIB, and IIIB. In Case IIA, Π will decrease if rB decreases. In Case
IIIA, Π will decrease if in equilibrium 2N+1N+1
L
NH
′(L) +H(L)− γβ > 0.
(5) Ψ will decrease in Case IIIA. The effect is ambiguous in Case IIA, IIB, and IIIB. However, if
LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0, then Ψ will increase in Cases IIA, IIB, and IIIB.
Proof: see Appendix B.2.
I IIA IIB IIIA IIIB
L + + + 0 +
D + + + 0 0
rB 0 ? 0 + 0
Π − ? − ? −
Ψ ? ? − ?
Table 1: Comparative statics for N across the different equilibrium regimes.
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When there are more banks, each bank has less impact on the loan rate and the deposit
rate. This gives banks a higher incentive to issue more loans and bank deposits, so both loans and
deposits increase with N in most cases. However, in Case IIIA, both L and D are given by corner
solutions, and hence they are not affected by a small increase in N . In Case IIIB, only D is given
by a corner solution, and hence L will increase if N is larger.
How government bond rate reacts to an increase in N depends on the equilibrium cases. First,
in Cases I, IIB, and IIIB, rB is fixed to exogenous variables ( 1β in case I and
1+iR
1+µ in Cases IIB and
IIIB), and therefore is unaffected by changes in N . In Case IIA, rB is determined by the marginal
return on loans (see expression (4.4)), which may increase or decrease following an increase in N .
This is because while L is larger (and hence the expected return on loans H(L) is smaller), the
impact of a marginal increase in L on the loan rate,
∣∣∣ LNH ′(L)∣∣∣, may also be smaller. In Case IIIA,
rB is also determined by the marginal return on loans. However, since L does not change, rB will be
unambiguously larger. Intuitively, competition between banks lowers the the impact of a marginal
increase in L on the loan rate,
∣∣∣ LNH ′(L)∣∣∣, which makes issuing loans more attractive compared to
investing in government bonds. As a result, the government bond rate must increase.
In general, bank profit decreases when there is more competition. However, as we have shown,
rB may increase, which can increase bank profit. If rB decreases in Case IIA, bank profit will
decrease as well. In Case IIIA, the condition 2N+1N+1
L
NH
′(L) + H(L) − γβ > 0 guarantees that the
increase in rB is sufficiently small so that bank profit will still decrease. Note that these conditions
are sufficient but not necessary for bank profit to decrease.
Finally, as shown by (5.2), the default probability depends on the banking industry’s total
deposit liabilities (i.e., DrD(D)), total return from loans for any given s (i.e., LH(L, s)), total
return from reserves (i.e., z
B(1+iR)
1+µ ), and total return from government bonds (i.e., b
BrB). The
bank default probability decreases in Case IIIA because a higher return from government bonds
(i.e., bBrB) provides a larger cushion against a negative shock. However, in Case IIA and IIB,
D and L will also change following an increase in N . An increase in D tends to increase default
probability, because it increases bank’s liabilities. An increase in L has ambiguous effects, because
it may increase or decrease the total return from loans. If LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0, however, the total
return from loans will decrease following an increase in L. In such case, bank default probability
will increase.
5.2 Increasing the Quantity of Government Bonds b
Next, we analyze how the quantity of government bonds in the economy affects equilibrium outcomes.
The quantity of bonds can be varied through open-market operations. For example, an increase in
b can result from an open-market sale of government bonds by the central bank.
Proposition 5.2 Consider an increase in b.
(1) L will decrease in Cases IIA and IIIA and remain unchanged in the other cases.
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(2) D will increase in Case IIA and remain unchanged in the other cases.
(3) rB will increase in Cases IIA and IIIA and remain unchanged in the other cases.
(4) Π will increase in Cases IIA and IIIA and remain unchanged in the other cases.
(5) Ψ will remain unchanged in Cases IIB and IIIB. The effect is ambiguous in Cases IIA and
IIIA. However, Ψ will decrease in Case IIIA if LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0.
Proof: see Appendix B.2.
I IIA IIB IIIA IIIB
L 0 − 0 − 0
D 0 + 0 0 0
rB 0 + 0 + 0
Π 0 + 0 + 0
Ψ ? 0 ? 0
Table 2: Comparative statics for b across the different equilibrium regimes.
In Case I, increasing b has no effect because banks are indifferent between holding one more
unit of government bonds or not. In Cases IIB and IIIB, increasing b also has no effect because banks
will simply substitute government bonds for reserves. In Cases IIA and IIIA, however, increasing b
will crowd out bank loans. In Case IIA, this will also lead to bank issuing more deposits. In Case
IIIA, because the equilibrium is in a corner solution for deposits, D will remain unchanged. In
these two cases, the government bond rate also increases to incentivize banks to hold the additional
bonds. This also means that banks receive a higher return from government bonds, which leads to
higher profit for banks.
Bank default probability, however, may increase or decrease in Case IIA and IIIA. Firstly, a
higher rb and a larger supply of government bonds tend to decrease default probability. However, a
smaller L may increase or decrease the total return from loans, and a larger D will increase banks’
liabilities. Consequently, the overall effect of increasing b on bank default is ambiguous in Case
IIA. However, if LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0, a smaller L will increase the return from loans. Since D does
not change in Case IIIA, this means that the default probability will decrease.
5.3 Increasing the Interest on Reserves iR
In this subsection, we analyse the effect of increasing iR.
Proposition 5.3 Consider an increase in iR.
(1) L will increase in Cases IIA, decrease in Cases IIB and IIIB, and remain unchanged in the
other cases.
(2) D will increase in Cases I, IIA, and IIB, and remain unchanged in the other cases.
(3) rB will decrease in Cases IIA, increase in Cases IIB and IIIB, and remain unchanged in the
other cases.
(4) Π will increase in all cases except Case IIA, in which the effect is ambiguous.
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(5) Ψ will decrease in Case IIIA. In all the other cases, the effect is ambiguous. However, Ψ will
also decrease in Case IIIB if LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0.
Proof: see Appendix B.2.
I IIA IIB IIIA IIIB
L 0 + − 0 −
D + + + 0 0
rB 0 − + 0 +
Π + ? + + +
Ψ ? ? − ?
Table 3: Comparative statics for iR across the different equilibrium regimes.
In Case IIA, the reserve requirement binds. For banks, funding more loans with more deposits
is costly because it means banks will have to hold more low-return reserves. Hence, for banks, a
higher iR lowers the cost of issuing bank deposits. Consequently, banks issue more deposits and
use them to fund additional loans. In Case IIB and IIIB, however, the reserve requirement does
not bind. This implies that banks are indifferent on the margin between making an additional
loan or holding reserves. When iR increases, reserves become more attractive than loans, so banks
reduce L. The changes in rB then follow directly from the changes in L because government bonds
and loans are substitutes for banks. When loans become more attractive to banks in Case IIA,
rB decreases. When loans become less attractive to banks in Case IIB and IIIB, rB increases.
Finally, L is unchanged in Case I because loan return is pinned by rB, which is equal to 1/β and
is unaffected by the change in iR. In Case IIIA, L and D are unchanged because the equilibrium
is characterized by a corner solution.
In general, bank profit is increasing in iR. However, because banks take the government bond
rate as given, they do not take into account the effect of their competition on the government bond
rate. In Case IIA, it is possible that the decrease in rB lowers bank profit. In all the other cases,
rB either increases or remains unchanged. Consequently, bank profit is increasing in iR.
Finally, the effect on bank default probability is in general ambiguous. While a higher iR can
lead to a larger holding of safe assets, it may also change L, which can either increase or decrease
the total return from loans. In Cases IIA and IIB, a higher iR also increases bank’s total deposit
liabilities, which tend to increase bank default probability. However, in Case IIIA, because L and
D remain unchanged, a higher iR only has the effect of increasing bank’s income from holding
reserves. Hence, bank default probability will unambiguously decrease. Finally, in Case IIIB, if
LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0, then because L will decrease, the total return from loans will increase. Since
D remains unchanged, bank default probability will decrease.
5.4 Increasing the Reserve Requirement δ
The next proposition summarizes the effects of increasing the reserve requirement.
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Proposition 5.4 Consider an increase in δ.
(1) L will decrease in Cases IIA and IIIA, and remain unchanged in the other cases.
(2) D will decrease in Case I, and remain unchanged in Cases IIB, IIIB, and IIIA. In Case IIA,
the effect is ambiguous.
(3) rB will increase in Cases IIA and IIIA, and remain unchanged in the other cases.
(4) Π will decrease in Case I, and remain unchanged in Cases IIB and IIIB. In Cases IIA and
IIIA, the effect is ambiguous.
(5) Ψ remains unchanged in Case IIB and IIIB. The effect is ambiguous in Cases IIA and IIIA.
However, Ψ will decrease in Case IIIA if LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0.
Proof: see Appendix B.2.
I IIA IIB IIIA IIIB
L 0 − 0 − 0
D − ? 0 0 0
rB 0 + 0 + 0
Π − ? 0 ? 0
Ψ ? 0 ? 0
Table 4: Comparative statics for δ across the different equilibrium regimes.
In Cases IIB and IIIB, the reserve requirement does not bind. Hence, increasing the reserve
requirement has no effect on the equilibrium. In Case IIA, the reserve requirement binds, and
increasing the reserve requirement will make it more costly for banks to fund investment with
deposits. Hence, L decreases and rB increases. However, to comply with the new reserve requirement,
banks also need to hold more reserves, which can be achieved through issuing more deposits.
Consequently, in this case, the effect on D is ambiguous.
In Case I, a higher reserve requirement increases the cost of issuing deposits, which also
happens in Cases IIA and IIIA. However, in the latter two cases, rB will also increase, which
will increase the income of banks. The mechanism is similar to when the government increases
iR: because banks take the government bond rate as given, they do not take the effect of their
competition on the government bond rate into account. In this case, the lower demand for
government bonds benefits banks. Consequently, the overall effect of increasing the reserve requirement
on bank profit is ambiguous in cases IIA and IIIA.
Finally, in Cases IIA and IIIA, while increasing the reserve requirement makes banks hold
more safe assets, it also forces banks to lower L, which may increase or decrease the total return
from loans. As a result, increasing the reserve requirement has an ambiguous effect on bank default
probability. However, in Case IIIB, if LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0, then because L will decrease, the total
return from loans will increase. Since D remains unchanged, bank default probability will decrease.
5.5 Increasing the Capital Requirement γ
Finally, we study the effect of increasing the capital requirement.
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Proposition 5.5 Consider an increase in γ.
(1) L will increase in Case IIIA, decrease in Cases IIB and IIIB, and remain unchanged in Case
I. If u(q) = q
1−σ−1




β where ε = 1− b/[(1− δ)D], L will also increase
in Case IIA.
(2) D will decrease in Case IIA, and remain unchanged in the other cases;





β , then r
B will decrease in Case IIA.
(4) Π will remain unchanged in Case I and decrease in the other cases.
(5) The effect on Ψ is in general ambiguous. However, suppose that LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0 in Cases
IIB, IIIA, and IIIB. Then Ψ will decrease in Cases IIB and IIIB but increase in Case IIIA.
Proof: see Appendix B.2.
I IIA IIB IIIA IIIB
L 0 ? − + −
D 0 − 0 0 0
rB 0 ? 0 − 0
Π 0 − − − −
Ψ ? ? ? ?
Table 5: Comparative statics for γ across the different equilibrium regimes.
First, the capital requirement is nonbinding in Case I since banks are indifferent about raising
more equity and investing it in bonds, so changing γ does not affect equilibrium outcomes. In
the other cases, an increase in γ implies that issuing loans becomes more expensive, since banks
need to hold more equity. One may think that this will make banks decrease the amount of loans
they make, but this is not true in every case. In Case IIA, banks would like to reduce loans, but
at the same time, raising more equity means banks have more funds to invest, and since loans
still pay a higher marginal return than reserves and banks already hold all bonds, loans are the
best investment option. Thus, L may actually increase as a reaction to the increase in γ. On the
liabilities side, the forced increase in equity leads to a reduction in deposits. Case IIIA is similar,
but with the difference being that D is pinned down and thus does not change. Since banks do not
reduce deposits, their only option is to invest in the new equity in L. Finally, note that rB reacts
accordingly in these cases: In Case IIA, it increases if L goes down, and decreases if L increases,
while it unambiguously decreases in Case IIIA. In Cases IIB and IIIB, the reserve requirement is
slack, and therefore banks prefer to invest in more reserves if they are forced to raise more equity.
Thus, L decreases in these cases, while D and rB are unaffected.
Bank profit will decrease except in Case I, where the capital requirement does not bind. This
is because compared to deposits, equity is more costly for banks to raise. In Cases IIA and IIIA,
bank profit will further decrease due to the decrease in rB.
Finally, the effect of γ on bank default probability is in general ambiguous. In Cases IIB
and IIIB, a higher γ will increase bank’s holdings of safe assets, but it will also lower L, which
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may increase or decrease the total return from loans. In Cases IIA and IIIA, the increase in L
(and also the decrease in D in Case IIA) tends to decrease bank default probability. The overall
effect is nevertheless ambiguous because the decrease in rB will lower bank profit. However, if
LH ′(L) + H(L) < 0, then because L decreases in Cases IIB and IIIB, the total return from loans
will increase. Since D remains unchanged in these cases, bank default probability will decrease. In
contrast, because L increases in Case IIIA, the total return from loans will decrease if LH ′(L) +
H(L) < 0. This means that bank default probability will increase.
6 Calibration
To quantify our results, we calibrate the model to the U.S. economy during 2016-2019. We choose
this time period since the Federal Reserve started actively using the interest rate on (excess) reserves
as a policy tool in 2016, and continued doing so until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.
All of our calibration targets are matched to moments from this time period, except for money
demand, for which we need a longer time series and we thus calibrate separately, using data from
1984-2007.
We set a period to be equal to one year and make the following assumptions on buyers’ utility
function u(q) and the success probabilities of entrepreneurs’ projects p(R,Ri, s):
u(q) = q
1−σ − 1
1− σ , (6.1)












We also assume that entrepreneur’s ability Ri follows a uniform distribution on [0, R̄], while the
aggregate shock s follows a truncated normal distribution. The realization of s is independent of
whether an individual entrepreneur’s project is successful or not.
There are 16 parameters to calibrate: inflation rate (µ), proportion of monitored meetings in
the DM (η), nominal interest rate on reserves (iR), reserve requirement (δ), capital requirement
(γ), discount factor (β), buyer’s preference (σ), the number of banks (N), upper bound of the
distribution of entrepreneur’s ability (R̄), government bond supply (b), the measure of entrepreneurs
(S), parameter α in p(R,Ri), and four parameters that describe the distribution of the aggregate
shock.
We pick the first 5 parameters directly to match the data. We obtain all data from Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) except for the proportion of non-cash transactions, which is from
the 2016 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice.8 We also pick β directly to be consistent with
8The value reported in the data is the number of transactions made with cash relative to the number of transactions
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literature.
Parameter Notation Value Calibration target
Inflation rate µ 1.82% Average inflation (CPI): 2016-19
Prop. of monitored DM meetings η 0.85 Prop. of non-cash transactions (2016)
Nominal interest rate on reserves iR 1.40% Average IOER: 2016-19
Reserve requirement δ 8.83% Average reserve requirement: 2016-19
Capital requirement γ 6% Basel III capital requirement (2016)
Discount factor β 0.98 Standard in the literature
Table 6: Externally calibrated parameters.
Next, we follow Rocheteau et al. (2018) and calibrate σ by matching the semi-elasticity of







where ι = (1 +µ)/β and qm is the output in unmonitored meetings (see Section 3.2). We calculate
empirical money demand semi-elasticity using the currency-to-nominal GDP ratio from FRED and
Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield from FRED. We set the period for calibration to 1959-2007.9
The following figure shows the money demand data between 1959 and 2007. Our estimated semi-
elasticity of money demand is -3.94, which corresponds to σ = 0.24.10
The third step is to jointly calibrate N , R̄, b, α, and S so that the expected return on loans
rL(1− P (rL)) (see Section 3.4), expected deposit rate rD, reserve-to-loan ratio zB/L, loan default
probability P (rL), and loans-to-GDP ratio match their counterparts in the data, i.e., average return
on loans, average deposit rate, average reserves-to-loan ratio, average loan default probability,
and average commercial and industrial loans-to-GDP ratio.11 The following table summarizes the
calibration results. We obtain all data from FRED except for loan rates, which are derived from
Call reports data collected by Drechsler et al. (2017).12 To calculate the average return on loans,
we divide total interest income on loans by total quantity of loans. We exclude the lowest 10% of
without cash, which directly matches the parameter in our model.
9We do not include data from 2008 and onwards since the demand for currency increased during and after the
financial crisis, likely for non-transactional reasons, such as store-of-value or flight-to-safety motives. Since our model
does not include such reasons to hold currency, we find it best to exclude post-crisis data. Chiu et al. (2019) argue
that one should use pre-crisis data to estimate money demand elasticity.
10This approach relies on the underlying assumption that the money demand semi-elasticity for transactional use
has not fundamentally changed between 1959-2007 and 2016-2019. To confirm this, we use a different method to
calibrate σ as a robustness check. Specifically, we calculate the elasticity M/(PY ) in the model for 2016-2019, where
M/P is the demand for real balances and bank deposits, and Y is real GDP. Then, we match model elasticity to
data. We obtain a similar value of σ = 0.31.
11Note that we do not target the supply of government bonds directly. The reason is that banks hold a lot more
assets in reality than we allow for in the model. Thus, government bonds should be interpreted as encompassing a
large array of safe assets that are traded on financial markets.
12We do not use deposit rate data from this source since it includes commercial deposits, while other variables in
our calibration (e.g. the proportion of non-cash transactions η) are for households only.
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Constant semi-elasticity = -3.94
Figure 4: Money demand
the sample as they are likely from safe loans, and then we calculate the weighted average across all
banks.
Parameter Notation Value Calibration target
Number of banks N 23 Avg. return on loans and Avg. deposit rate: 2016-19
Upper bound of ability dist. R̄ 1.95 Avg. return on loans and Avg. deposit rate: 2016-19
Government bond supply b 0.42 Avg. reserves-to-loan ratio: 2016-19
Parameter in p(R,Ri) α 574.22 Avg. loan default rate: 2016-19
Measure of entrepreneurs S 0.51 Avg. comm. & ind. loans-to-GDP ratio: 2016-19
Table 7: Internally calibrated parameters.
The final step is to calibrate the four parameters that describe the truncated normal distribution
of the aggregate shock: µ̂, σ̂, the lower bound â, and the upper bound b̂. Note that µ̂ and σ̂ are
the mean and variance of the corresponding normal distribution. We fix â to 0 and b̂ to 50. Since























where φ(.) and Φ(.) are the PDF and CDF of standard normal distribution, respectively. We use
the ratio between bank failure cost to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and total
25
transnational deposits as a proxy for bank default probability in data. The average of this ratio
between 2016 and 2019 is 0.02%. We then calibrate σ̂ so that the default probability given by
(3.28) matches the data. We obtain σ̂ = 3.08 and µ̂ = 0.25.
6.1 Model Fit and Calibration Results
The model fit is summarized in Table 8. Even though our model is highly nonlinear, all targets are
matched very closely.
Target Data Model
Average nominal return on loans: 2016-19 5.47% 5.44%
Average nominal deposit rate: 2016-19 0.05% 0.06%
Average reserves-to-loan ratio: 2016-19 12.65% 12.65%
Average loan default rate: 2016-19 1.26% 1.26%
Average commercial and industry loans-to-GDP ratio: 2016-19 10.80% 10.80%
Average bank default probability: 2016-19 0.02% 0.02%
Table 8: Model Fit
According to our calibration, the U.S. economy was in equilibrium Case IIB during 2016-
2019 – a scenario where banks hold excess reserves, while the nominal interest rate on deposits
is positive. This makes a lot of sense, as banks were indeed holding excess reserves during that
period and the Federal Reserve was conducting monetary policy via the interest rate on excess
reserves. The average nominal deposit rate was also positive during our calibration period, even
though only barely so. As a result, our calibrated economy is also very close to the transition point
into equilibrium Case IIIB, which we will discuss in depth in the next section. Furthermore, there
were 23 banks in the U.S. economy according to our calibration. This result should not be taken
literally - instead, our model implies that the banking sector behaved as if there were 23 banks
with equal size and market power, while in reality banks differ in size.
7 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, we analyse how changes in the degree of banking competition, in the policy rate,
and in the reserve requirement would have affected the U.S. economy during 2016-2019. As we have
discussed in Section 5, the theoretical effects of changes in these variables differ across equilibrium
cases. The analysis in this section allows us to not only pin down the direction of the effects the
policy changes have on other variables but also quantify them. We also study how the effectiveness
of monetary policy is affected by the degree of banking competition in the economy, by comparing
how changes in monetary policy affect outcomes in the baseline versus a counterfactual world with
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a different degree of banking competition.13
In addition to the equilibrium outcomes discussed in Section 4, we also study the effects of
policies on expected aggregate welfare W , which is simply an equal-weighted sum of all agents’
expected utility:




R∗(rL, Ri)[1− p(R∗(rL, Ri), Ri, s)]f(Ri) dRi
]
− L. (7.1)
First, (1− η)[u(qm)− qm] + η[u(qd)− qd] is the total surplus from trade in the DM. Second, note
thatR∗(rL, Ri) is given by (3.12), and βSE
[∫ R̄
rL R
∗(rL, Ri)[1− p(R∗(rL, Ri), Ri, s)]f(Ri) dRi
]
is the
discounted expected output by entrepreneurs, where the expectation is taken over s, the aggregate
shock, and S is the measure of entrepreneurs. Recall that all agents derive linear utility from
consuming the CM good, and buyers and bankers derive linear disutility from producing the CM




2N = 12 2N = 46
W −1.52 % +1.02 %
L −3.67 % +2.12 %
D −0.19 % +2.18 %
iL +3.37 pp −1.95 pp
iD −0.0574 pp +0.67 pp
Π +167.12 % −74.1 %
Ψ −0.0184 pp +0.42 pp
Case IIIB IIB
Table 9: The effect of changes in N on equilibrium outcomes.
Table 9 reports the changes in macroeconomic outcomes relative to our baseline calibration with
banking competition being twice and half as high as it effectively was, respectively.14 Doubling
N keeps the economy in equilibrium Case IIB, while halving the number of banks moves the
economy into Case IIIB. More banking competition is good for welfare but bad for banks: doubling
the competition among banks increases welfare by 1.02%, but reduces profit per bank by 74.1%.
Note that profit per bank would have only reduced by 50% (since N is doubled) had each bank
13We focus on a few policies and mostly on discrete changes in order to highlight what we find most interesting.
For more thorough analyses, see Appendix A for how changes in N , iR, b, δ, and γ affect all equilibrium outcomes in
our calibrated economy.
14Since N = 23 in our calibration and the number of banks needs to be an integer, 2N = 46 while 12N = 12.
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simply reduced their assets and liabilities by 50% while keeping the relative composition of their
balance sheet unchanged. A decrease larger than 50% means that not only does each bank receive
less profit, but the entire banking industry receives less profit as well. This is because the more
banks there are, the less banks internalize the effects of their actions on equilibrium interest rates.
This implies that the wedge between deposit and loan rates and thus profit margins for banks are
reduced. In turn, the smaller wedge between these rates also explains the increase in welfare that
comes with higher N : on the one hand, higher deposit rates make holding liquidity less costly for
buyers, thereby increasing their DM consumption. On the other hand, lower loan rates increase
CM investment. Note that the deposit rate only decreases marginally when banking competition
is further reduced relative to the benchmark. The reason for this is that deposit rates are close to
zero already, and once they are at zero they cannot be reduced further. Even though this dampens
the negative effects from reducing banking competition on welfare, the welfare loss from halving
banking competition relative to the benchmark is larger than the welfare gain from doubling the
number of banks. This goes to show that welfare reacts particularly strongly to changes in the
number of banks when N is low.














Case IIIB to Case IIB
Figure 5: Effects of N on Bank Default Probability.
In our theoretical analysis, we note that the effect of changes in N on the bank default
probability Ψ is ambiguous in cases IIB and IIIB. Our quantitative analysis shows that Ψ is
increasing in N , so while stronger banking competition is good for welfare, it also increases the risk
of bank failure, and it does so in a non-trivial way: Since the probability of bank failure is only
about 0.02 % according to our calibration, the increase by 0.42pp in Ψ that follows from doubling N
implies that bank failure becomes more than 20 times more likely with fiercer banking competition.
Figure 5 shows how the probability of bank default varies with N .
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7.2 Changes in the Policy Rate
Next, we study how varying the policy rate affects equilibrium outcomes.
iR − 1pp iR + 1pp
W +0.40 % −0.21 %
L +1.00 % −1.00 %
D −0.19 % +3.23 %
iL −0.92 pp +0.92 pp
iD −0.0574 pp +0.99 pp
Π −35.53 % +1.23 %
Ψ +0.20 pp +0.0012 pp
Case IIIB IIB
Table 10: The effect of changes in iR on equilibrium outcomes.
Table 10 shows how an increase or a decrease in the nominal interest rate on reserves iR by
1pp affects the calibrated economy.15 Recall that we calibrate the model to an interest rate on
reserves of 1.4%, so the counterfactuals presented here correspond to economies with iR = 0.4%
and iR = 2.4%, respectively. The first main takeaway is the welfare effects of changes in interest
on reserves. In general, increases in the deposit rate are good for welfare since they allow for more
trades in the DM, while lower loan rates are good for welfare since they increase investment and
lower risk-taking of entrepreneurs. Thus, the welfare effect of changes in the policy rate is in general
ambiguous. However, in equilibrium Case IIIB, changes in the policy rate affect only the loan rate,
since the deposit rate is equal to zero and does not react to marginal changes in the policy rate.
Since our calibrated economy is very close to equilibrium Case IIIB, it is no surprise that a decrease
in the policy rate is good for welfare, as the positive effects from lowering the loan rate dominate
the small negative effect from further lowering the deposit rate to zero. Interestingly, an increase
in the policy rate lowers welfare in our calibration, which shows that the negative effects from
reducing loans dominate the positive effects from increasing deposits.
Another important takeaway from Table 10 is that interest-rate pass-through is incomplete
under imperfect competition. The loan rate changes by only 0.92pp following a 1pp change in the
policy rate in either direction. Pass-through to the deposit rate is almost complete with 0.99pp
following an increase in the policy rate, but for decreases in the policy rate, the deposit rate barely
changes as it is close to the zero-lower bound already in the baseline calibration. We investigate in
more detail how interest rate pass-through is affected by N in the next section.
The third main takeaway from Table 10 is the strong reduction in profits per bank to a decrease
15Since monetary policy in the U.S. was mainly conducted through the interest rate on excess reserves during
our calibration time period, we focus on iR as the policy rate here. However, as long as the reserve requirement is
nonbinding, (i.e., the economy is in cases IIIB or IIB), iR = ib and both can be interpreted as the policy rate in our
model economy. An increase in the policy rate could also be implemented through open-market operations, which
leads to similar results, as we discuss in Appendix A.
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in the policy rate. While we have already shown theoretically that an increase in the policy rate
increases profits per bank in Cases IIB and IIIB, the quantitative analysis here shows that this
effect is particularly strong in equilibrium Case IIIB. This is because while in general, the higher
policy rate increases both the return on the banks’ assets and the cost of their liabilities, the latter
effect is nonexistent in Case IIIB as the deposit rate is stuck at zero. This can also be seen from
Figure 6, which shows that Π is strongly increasing in the policy rate as long as the economy is
in Case IIIB, while the increase becomes much more gradual once the economy is in Case IIB.16
Another way to think about this is that banks with market power would like to set a constant
wedge between the loan rate and the deposit rate, but due to the zero lower bound, they cannot set
the lower bound of this wedge (the deposit rate) arbitrarily low. This reduces their profit margin.
In this sense, setting interest rates close to zero is a way for the central bank to reduce banks’
market power.









Case IIIB to Case IIB
Figure 6: Effects of iR on Bank Profit.
The final result we want to highlight is the effect of policy rate changes on the bank default
probability Ψ, which are generally ambiguous in the model. It turns out that the Fed has set
monetary policy pretty effectively in terms of minimizing the risk of bank default during 2016-2019,
since changes in the policy rate in either direction would have led to increases in the probability
of bank default. Figure 7 shows how Ψ changes with the policy rate and in particular how lower
policy rates drastically increase the probability of bank default once the economy is in Case IIIB.
16The Figure also shows that the economy is precisely at the transition point between Case IIIB and IIB in our
benchmark, so the effects from a decrease in the policy rate reported in Table 10 play out almost entirely in Case
IIIB, while those from an increase in the policy rate play out in Case IIB.
30










Case IIIB to Case IIB
Figure 7: Effects of iR on Bank Default Probability.
7.3 Effectiveness of Monetary Policy with Different N
After discussing how changes in the degree of banking competition and changes in monetary policy
affect the calibrated economy, we assess how the two interact by repeating the exercise in the
previous section with 12N ≈ 12, N = 23 (baseline), and 2N = 46. The purpose is to compare how
the effectiveness of monetary policy changes when N varies. Table 11 reports effects of an increase
in iR while Table 12 reports effects of a decrease in iR. In both tables, the results in the N column
are the changes relative to our baseline calibration, which we already reported in Table 10. The
results in the 12N (2N) column are the changes relative to an economy with
1
2N (2N) but with the
baseline interest on reserves (i.e., 1.4%).
1
2N N 2N
W −0.40 % −0.21 % −0.25 %
L −1.00 % −1.00 % −1.00 %
D unchanged +3.23 % +3.23 %
iL +0.89 pp +0.92 pp +0.94 pp
iD unchanged +0.99 pp +0.99 pp
Π +26.48 % +1.23 % +1.21 %
Ψ −0.0014 pp +0.0012 pp +0.0316 pp
Case transition IIIB unchanged IIB unchanged IIB unchanged




W +0.40 % +0.40 % +0.26 %
L +1.00 % +1.00 % +1.00 %
D unchanged −0.19 % −2.31 %
iL −0.89 pp −0.92 pp −0.94 pp
iD unchanged −0.0574 pp −0.72 pp
Π −26.46 % −35.53 % −20.77 %
Ψ +0.023 pp + 0.20 pp +0.32 pp
Case transition IIIB unchanged IIB to IIIB IIB to IIIB
Table 12: The effects of a decrease in iR by 1 pp with different N .
From Tables 11 and 12, we can see how the pass-through to loan rates increases with N ,
which implies that the monetary authority gains stronger control over investment with higher
banking competition.17 For the deposit rate, the analysis is complicated by the zero-lower bound.
However, Table 11 shows that pass-through to deposit rates is already pretty complete in the
baseline economy, and that a further increase in the number of banks does not increase it. On
the other hand, fewer banks drive the economy closer to the zero-lower bound. Specifically, with
1
2N = 12 banks, even a 1pp increase in the policy rate is not enough to lift the deposit rate above
zero, and interest rate cuts do (next to) nothing with 12N or N banks, because the deposit rate is
at zero or very close to zero. Thus, lower banking competition indirectly reduces pass-through to
deposit rates, thereby reducing the central bank’s control over inside money creation by bringing
deposit rates closer to the zero-lower bound.
The effect of monetary policy on welfare appears to be non-monotone in N , which is due to
two opposing effects. As discussed in the previous section, the effect of policy rate changes on
welfare is particularly strong in equilibrium Case IIIB, because monetary policy only affects loan
rates in this case. Since a lower N makes it more likely that the economy is in Case IIIB, this
effect leads to stronger welfare effects of monetary policy when N is low. However, the increased
pass-through with higher N leads to larger reactions in the economy to policy changes and thus
stronger welfare effects of monetary policy when N is higher.
For profits per bank, the prior analysis has shown that they react much more strongly to
interest rate changes in equilibrium Case IIIB than IIB. Since a lower number of banks makes it
more likely that the economy is in Case IIIB, lower N tends to make profits per bank more reactive
to monetary policy.
Finally, for the probability of bank default, the analysis is further complicated by the fact that
the probability of bank default changes non-monotonically with iR. Perhaps most interesting in
this regard is the effect of changes in the policy rate in the economy with 2N . We already know
17Interestingly, the relative change in loans made is the same in all three regimes, but note that the absolute
change is larger with higher N , as higher N increases loans made in the economy and thus the same relative change
has to correspond to a larger absolute change.
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from Table 9 that doubling the degree of competition in the banking sector significantly increases
the probability of bank default. Tables 11 and 12 now show that this increase cannot be undone
by simultaneously changing the policy rate – instead, changing the policy rate in either direction
leads to further increases in the probability of bank default. In particular, lowering the policy rate
by 1pp with 2N increases the probability of bank default to almost 0.8%, compared to only 0.02%
in our calibrated economy.
We can also measure the effectiveness of monetary policy by varying government bond supply
or by targeting the level of excess reserves. To study the former, we increase the bond supply by
10%, which corresponds to an open-market sale of assets by the central bank. We again repeat the




ib +1.40 pp +0.55 pp +0.098 pp
W −0.54 % −0.12 % −0.0239 %
L −1.41 % −0.55 % −0.098 %
D +0.34 % +1.62 % +0.29 %
iL +1.25 pp +0.51 pp +0.092 pp
iD +0.11 pp +0.50 pp +0.089 pp
Π +31.06 % +0.56 % +0.10 %
Ψ −0.0015 pp +0.00087 pp +0.0033 pp
Case transition IIIB to IIA IIB to IIA IIB to IIA
Table 13: The effects of an increase in b by 10 % with different N .
First, note that in all three scenarios, the economy transitions from a case where the reserve
requirement does not bind to a case where it binds. This is necessary for open-market operations
to have real effects, as we have shown in our theoretical analysis. Second, note that the effects of
increasing b on the bond interest rate vastly differ across the three economies. With 2N banks, the
bond interest rate increases by less than 0.1pp, while it increases by 1.4pp with 12N banks. The
effect on loans and loan rates also tends to be stronger with lower N . On the other hand, the effect
on deposits shows no clear pattern as N changes.
When the competition in the banking sector is high, banks also compete fiercely over available
assets, so they are willing to hold the additional bonds even if they offer only a slightly higher return
than the assets the banks already hold do. If banking competition is low, banks are more reluctant
to change their balance sheet composition, and thus must be induced by much higher rates to hold
the additional bonds. A similar story is going on with loans: With low banking competition and
the high increase in the bond interest rate, banks reduce loans by a lot, which benefits them in two
ways: First, they can get rid of the most risky loans as the loan rate increases and replace them
with safe government bonds instead. Second, they earn more on their remaining loans as the loan
18We focus on open-market sales here because an open-market purchase of assets has no effect in equilibrium Case
IIIB.
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rate goes up. With high banking competition, banks do not take the marginal effect on the loan
rate into account in the same extent, and thus are much less willing to reduce loans made.
In principle, banks are also more willing to raise additional liabilities in order to finance the
purchase of the additional bonds when banking competition is fierce, whereas they are much more
wary of doing so when there is less competition, as raising more deposits increases the deposit rate
and thus also the cost of liabilities for banks. However, in equilibrium Cases IIB and IIIB, the first
margin banks adjust as a reaction to the increase in bonds are their excess reserve holdings, as
bonds and reserves are perfect substitutes whenever the reserve requirement does not bind. Since
banks hold more excess reserves when banking competition is stronger, the amount of deposits
made by banks starts reacting to the increase in bonds at a later point, which explains why the
increase in deposits is smallest under 2N .19
7.4 Changes in the Reserve Requirement
Before concluding the paper, we highlight how changing the reserve requirement δ affects the
probability of bank failure Ψ and bank profits Π in our calibration. As we discussed in Section 5.4,
increasing the reserve requirement has ambiguous effects on these variables in equilibrium Cases
IIA and IIIA. The result that increasing the reserve requirement does not always make bank default
less likely may seem counter-intuitive, as the reserve requirement is a policy instrument which is
typically used in order to make banks safer. Figure 8 shows how changing δ affects the probability of
bank failure in our calibration and shows that increasing δ does indeed lead to a higher probability
of bank default once it is set high enough to move the economy into Case IIA.
Perhaps even more surprisingly, profits per bank are also increasing in δ in our calibration,
as can be seen in Figure 9. This seems counter-intuitive, since banks could always hold more
reserves if that allows them to increase profits. However, forcing all banks to hold more reserves
is different from banks holding more reserves voluntarily, because it has effects on other assets,
namely government bonds. When banks are forced to hold more reserves, their demand for bonds
decreases. Since the amount of bonds available for banks to hold is independent of their demand,
this leads to an increase in the bond interest rate. Thus, Π increases in δ because the positive
externality from the higher bond rate dominates the cost of holding more reserves.20
19Note that the different results from the experiments on interest on reserves and open-market operations are not
due to the policy we study, but to the way we design the experiments. I.e., we could design the experiment such that
we study an open-market sale of assets that leads to a 1pp increase in iB for all N we study, and then the results
would be the same as in our interest on reserves experiment. To put this differently, it does not matter which policy
tool the central bank uses, but just whether an interest rate or an asset quantity is targeted. We think that both
results are interesting and that the interest rate target is somewhat more natural with interest on reserves, while the
asset quantity target can be more naturally studied with open-market operations (understanding that when central
banks use open-market operations in practice, they typically also follow an interest rate target).
20It is important to note that this analysis assumes passive monetary policy. If the monetary authority
simultaneously enacts open-market operations to keep the bond interest rate constant, the positive externality will
vanish.
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Case IIB to Case IIA
Figure 8: Effects of δ on Bank Default Probability











Case IIB to Case IIA
Figure 9: Effects of δ on Bank Profit
For a graphical analysis of how changes in δ and in the capital requirement γ affect other
equilibrium outcomes, see Appendix A.
8 Conclusion
We build a dynamic general equilibrium model with oligopolistic banking competition and risky
investment to study how these features affect the transmission of monetary policy to the real
economy. We show that including these characteristics of developed economies is relevant to
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understand how policymakers can affect the real economy. Our model entails three equilibrium
cases: One where banks are indifferent between raising deposits and sweat equity, one where the
deposit rate is strictly positive, but the marginal cost of deposits is strictly below the marginal
cost of equity, and one where the nominal deposit rate is equal to zero. The latter two can be
further distinguished depending on whether the reserve requirement does or does not bind. The
theoretical effects of changing the number of banks in the economy, the supply of bonds, the interest
rate on reserves, the reserve requirement, and the capital requirement on macroeconomic variables
differ among these cases, and some of them are ambiguous even within cases. The calibration of
our model to the U.S. economy during 2016-2019 shows that welfare could have been improved by
either increasing competition in the banking sector or reducing the policy rate, but only at the cost
of significantly increasing the probability of bank default. We also document that bank profits are
increasing in the policy rate, with the effect being particularly strong close to the zero-lower bound,
and that interest rate pass-through of monetary policy is incomplete under imperfect competition.
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Appendix A Additional Quantitative Results
1
2N N 2N
bB +9.25 % (+0.039) +12.34 % (+0.052) +14.81 % (+0.0625)
W −0.40 % −0.23 % −0.27 %
L −1.00 % −1.00 % −1.00 %
D unchanged +2.94 % +2.94 %
iL +0.89 pp +0.92 pp +0.94 pp
iD unchanged +0.90 pp +0.91 pp
Π +24.03 % +1.03 % +1.01 %
Ψ −0.0014 pp +0.0016 pp +0.0345 pp
Case transition IIIB to IIIA IIB to IIA IIB to IIA
Table 14: The effects of an increase in ib by 1 pp with different N .
Instead of increasing the policy rate by increasing the interest rate on reserves iR, the monetary authority
could also conduct open-market operations such that the policy rate increases by 1pp. Table 14 shows the
effect of this policy with different N . By comparing these results with those in Table 11 , we can determine
to which extent it matters whether the monetary authority uses open-market operations or the interest rate
on reserves to increase the policy rate by 1pp. For loans, loan rates, and the probability of default by
entrepreneurs, it does not matter which rate is increased by 1pp, as the economy reacts in exactly the same
way. For deposits, deposit rates, bank profits, and the probability of bank default, it matters slightly, because
increasing the interest rate on reserves implies iR = ib continues to hold as the bond interest rate increases
endogenously and thus banks earn this (marginal) return on all their assets. Meanwhile, increasing the bond
rate through open-market operations while keeping the interest rate on reserves constant implies ib > iR,
which in turn makes the reserve requirement bind, and implies that banks earn a lower marginal return on
their required reserves than on their remaining assets, which lowers their profits and their willingness to
issue deposits. The most interesting result from 14 however is that the size of the open-market operation
that is required to engineer an increase in ib by 1pp is strongly increasing with N .
Figures 10-14 show how changes in N , iR, b, δ, and γ affect loan rates, deposit rates, nominal bond rates,
loans, deposits, aggregate welfare, the probability of bank failure, and profits per bank in our calibration.
We highlighted some of these in the main text, but we also want to report the others here for completeness.
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Case IIIB to Case IIB
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Case IIIB to Case IIB
Figure 10: Effects of N
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Case IIIB to Case IIB
Figure 11: Effects of iR
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Case IIB to Case IIA
Case IIA to Case I
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Case IIA to Case I
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Case IIB to Case IIA
Case IIA to Case I
Figure 12: Effects of b
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Case IIB to Case IIA
Figure 13: Effects of δ
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Figure 14: Effects of γ
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Appendix B Proofs
B.1 Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1: It is easy to see that if H ′(L) < 0 and H ′′(L) < 0 for all L ∈ [0, S] and
rD′(D) > 0 and rD′′(D) ≥ 0 for all D ≥ 0, then in all five cases (Case I, IIA, IIB, IIIA, and IIIB), there is a
unique solution to bank’s problem as long as such a solution exists. We need only show that for any given
parameter values, there is one and only one case that can exist in equilibrium.
First, suppose the parameter values are such that Case I exists and denote the equilibrium L and D as
LI and DI . Now, consider Case IIA. If we plug in LI and D = ((1− γ)LI + b)/(1− δ) into (4.3), we have
rD(D) + D
N
rD′(D) > 1− δ
β
+ δ(1 + i
R)
1 + µ , (B.1)
which means L must be smaller to satisfy (4.3). Then, we have LNH
′(L) +H(L) > 1β , which cannot happen
in equilibrium because banks would have raised more equity and lend more to entrepreneurs. In other words,
Case IIA cannot exist. Next, consider Case IIB. If it exists, because
(1− γ)(1 + iR)








+ δ(1 + i
R)
1 + µ >
1 + iR
1 + µ , (B.2)
we have LIIB > LI and DIIB < DI . Since bB ≤ (1 − δ)D − (1 − γ)L, LIIB > LI and DIIB < DI mean
that banks hold fewer government bonds, a contradiction. Finally, consider Cases IIIA and IIIB. In the first
case, the existence of a solution would imply that L is smaller, which means LNH
′(L) + H(L) > 1β . In the
second case, the existence of a solution would imply that bB is smaller, a contradiction.
Second, suppose the parameter values are such that Case IIA exists. By the above arguments, Case I
cannot exist. Note also that in Case IIA, we have
rD(D) + D
N
rD′(D) = (1− δ)rB + δ(1 + i
R)
1 + µ >
1 + iR











1 + µ +
γ
(1− γ)β . (B.4)
If Case IIB exists, thenD will be smaller but L will be larger. This means bB must be smaller, a contradiction.
Similarly, Case IIIB cannot exist. Finally, if Case IIIA exists, then because Case IIA exists by assumption,
banks could have increased their profits by increasing D and L, a contradiction.
Third, suppose the parameter values are such that Case IIB exists. By the above arguments, Case I
and IIA cannot exist. If Case IIIB exists, because rD(D) = 11+µ , it must be that
rD(D) + D
N
rD′(D) < 1 + i
R
1 + µ . (B.5)
Then banks could have increased their profits by increasing D and investing it into reserves, a contradiction.
If Case IIIA exists, then banks could also have increased their profits by increasing D and investing it into
reserves.
Finally, suppose the parameter values are such that Case IIIA exists. By the above arguments, Case I,
IIA, and IIB cannot exist. Note that in Case IIIA,






− γ(1− γ)β >
1 + iR
1 + µ (B.6)
If Case IIIB exists, then L would be larger so bB would have been smaller, a contradiction. This also means
that if Case IIIB exists, none of the other cases can exist. Hence, if there exists an equilibrium, then it is
unique. 
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B.2 Proofs for Section 5
Before we prove Proposition 5.1 to 5.4, we prove the following lemma that will be useful later. Define
H(L, s) = rL(L)[1− P (rL(L), s)].
Lemma B.1 Assume there exists a random variable Z such that
∣∣HL(L, s)∣∣ ≤ Z a.s. for all L and that
E(Z) <∞. Then H ′(L) = E[HL(L, s)], where the expectation is taken over s.
Proof: Note that














where h(t) ∈ (L,L+ t) exists because of the Mean Value Theorem. Since
∣∣HL(L, s)∣∣ ≤ Z a.s. for all L, then
by the Dominated Convergence Theorem, we have
H ′(L) = lim
t→0
E[HL(h(t), s)] = E[HL(L, s)], (B.8)
which is the desired result. 
Proof of Proposition 5.1: We consider the effects of increasing N to N + 1 in all five cases.
Case I
In this case, the FOCs are
L
N + 1H






D′(D) = 1− δ
β
+ δ(1 + i
R)
1 + µ . (B.10)
Because H ′(L) < 0 and rD′(D) > 0, the left-hand side of (B.9) will be larger, while the left-hand side of
(B.10) will be smaller than before. Hence, L and D must increase. Since rB = 1/β, it is unaffected by the
increase in N .
Bank profit is given by
− E


















If bank profit is equal to or larger than before, then one bank could have deviated and increase the loans
and deposits it issues when there were N banks. This will give the deviating bank a strictly higher profit, a
contradiction.
Case IIA
In this case, we have D = ((1− γ)L+ b)/(1− δ) and
L
N + 1H
′(L) +H(L) + (1− γ)δ(1 + i
R)











If the number of banks increases to N + 1, the left-hand side will increase while the right-hand side will
decrease. Hence, L must increase, which means D will increase as well. Note that rB is given by






− γ(1− γ)β , (B.13)
so (B.12) can be rewritten as
rD(D) + D
N + 1r
D′(D) = (1− δ)rB + δ(1 + i
R)
1 + µ . (B.14)
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Since the left-hand side may increase or decrease compared to the benchmark, rB may decrease, increase,
or remain unchanged. If rB decreases or remains the same, then bank profit will be lower.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)δD
1 + µ + br
B . (B.15)
Take total derivative to get[










H ′′(L) +H ′(L)
]
dL
= G(ŝ)LHs(L, ŝ) dŝ+
{∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)]
}
dL. (B.16)
Note that Dr̂D′(D) + r̂D(D)− (1+i
R)δ





′′(L) +H ′(L) < 0. In addition, by Lemma B.1
we have∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] < E[LH ′(L, s) +H(L, s)] = LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0,
Hence, default probability will increase.
Case IIB
In this case, the FOCs are
rD(D) + D
N + 1r
D′(D) = 1 + i
R









= 1 + i
R
1 + µ +
γ
(1− γ)β . (B.18)
Similar to Case I, L and D must increase. Since rB = 1+i
R
1+µ , government bond rate is unaffected by the
increase in N .
Bank profit is given by
− E


















Again, similar to Case I, if bank profit is equal to or larger than before, then one bank could have deviated
and increase the loans and deposits it issues when there were N banks. This will give the deviating bank a
strictly higher profit, a contradiction.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)(D − (1− γ)L)
1 + µ . (B.20)
Take total derivative to get[




dD + (1 + i
R)(1− γ)
1 + µ dL
= G(ŝ)LHs(L, ŝ) dŝ+
{∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)]
}
dL. (B.21)
Note that Dr̂D′(D) + r̂D(D)− 1+i
R
1+µ > 0. In addition, by Lemma B.1 we have∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] < E[LH ′(L, s) +H(L, s)] = LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0,
Hence, default probability will increase.
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Case IIIA






(1 + µ). (B.22)
Then increasing the number of banks to N + 1 has no effect on L or D. Since rB is given by






− γ(1− γ)β , (B.23)
it will increase following the increase in N .
Next, consider bank profit. Note that the bond rate when there are N banks is LNH
′(L) + H(L) − γβ ,





















































In other words, for each bank, the income from government bonds, bBrB , will decrease when there are N + 1
banks, despite that bond rate is higher. Hence, bank profit will decrease.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)δD
1 + µ + br
B . (B.26)
Since increasing N has no effect on L or D but rB will increase, default probability will decrease.
Case IIIB















= 1 + i
R
1 + µ +
γ
(1− γ)β . (B.28)
Hence, L will increase while D remain unchanged. This means that banks will raise more equity and lower
the investment in reserves. Since rB = 1+i
R
1+µ , government bond rate is unaffected by the increase in N .
Similar to Case IIB, bank profit must decrease, because otherwise one bank could have deviated and
increase the loans it issues. This will give the deviating bank a strictly higher profit, a contradiction.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)(D − (1− γ)L)
1 + µ . (B.29)
Take total derivative to get
(1 + iR)(1− γ)
1 + µ dL
= G(ŝ)LHs(L, ŝ) dŝ+
{∫ s̄
ŝ




Note that by Lemma B.1 we have∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] < E[LH ′(L, s) +H(L, s)] = LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0,
Hence, default probability will increase. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2: We consider the effects of a marginal increase in b in all five cases.
Case I
In this case, because banks do not hold all government bonds, a marginal increase in b has no effect on L or
D. Since rB = 1/β, it is unaffected by the increase in b. Similarly, bank profit is not affected either.
Case IIA
In this case, we have D = ((1− γ)L+ b)/(1− δ) and
L
N
H ′(L) +H(L) + (1− γ)δ(1 + i
R)











Increasing b while holding L constant will increase D, which means the right-hand side will be larger than
the left-hand side. This means that L must decrease for the equation to hold. Because L will be lower, the
right-hand side will be larger than the benchmark, which means D will increase. Since rB is given by






− γ(1− γ)β , (B.31)
it will increase after an increase in b.



















Since rB is higher, bank profit is higher even if bank’s assets and liabilities remain the same. Hence, bank
profit must be higher.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)δD
1 + µ + br
B . (B.33)
Take the derivative w.r.t. b to get[
































′′(L) +H ′(L) < 0. However, the overall effect is ambiguous because the
terms Dr̂D′(D) + r̂D(D)− (1+i
R)δ
1+µ > 0 and
∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] may
be positive or negative.
Case IIB
In this case, because the reserve requirement does not bind, a marginal increase in b will simply lead banks
to substitute bonds for reserves. Hence, it will have no effect on L or D. Since rB = 1+i
R
1+µ , it is unaffected
by the increase in b. Similarly, bank profit and default probability are not affected either.
Case IIIA
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(1 + µ). (B.35)
Hence, L will decrease while D remain unchanged. Since rB is given by






− γ(1− γ)β , (B.36)
it will increase after an increase in b.
Similar to Case IIA, bank profit must increase, because rB is higher so profit is higher even if bank’s





LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)δD
1 + µ + br
B . (B.37)
Take the derivative w.r.t. b to get





















Because ∂L∂b < 0 and by Lemma B.1 we have∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] < E[LH ′(L, s) +H(L, s)] = LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0,
default probability will decrease.
Case IIIB
Similar to Case IIB, a marginal increase in b will lead banks to substitute bonds for reserves. Hence, it will
have no effect on L or D. Since rB = 1+i
R
1+µ , it is unaffected by the increase in b. Similarly, bank profit and
default probability are not affected either. 
Proof of Proposition 5.3: We consider the effects of a marginal increase in iR in all five cases.
Case I
In this case, the FOCs are
L
N






rD′(D) = 1− δ
β
+ δ(1 + i
R)
1 + µ . (B.40)
Hence, L will remain unchanged while D will increase. Since rB = 1/β, it is remains unchanged.





















Since iR is higher, bank profit is higher even if bank’s assets and liabilities remain the same. Hence, bank
profit must be higher.
Case IIA
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In this case, we have D = ((1− γ)L+ b)/(1− δ) and
L
N
H ′(L) +H(L) + (1− γ)δ(1 + i
R)











Hence, if L is held constant, the left-hand side will increase. This means that L must increase, which means
D will increase as well. Since rB is given by






− γ(1− γ)β , (B.43)
it will decrease after an increase in iR.



















Although iR is higher, rB is lower. Hence, the overall effect on bank profit is ambiguous.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)δD
1 + µ + br
B . (B.45)
Take the derivative w.r.t. iR to get[







































′′(L) +H ′(L) < 0, and
[









> 0. Also,∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] may be positive or negative. Hence, the overall
effect is ambiguous.
Case IIB
In this case, the FOCs are
rD(D) + D
N
rD′(D) = 1 + i
R









= 1 + i
R
1 + µ +
γ
(1− γ)β . (B.48)
Hence, L will decrease while D will increase. Since rB = 1+i
R
1+µ , it will increase following an increase in i
R.
Bank profit is given by
− E


















Similar to Case I, since iR is higher, bank profit is higher even if bank’s assets and liabilities remain the
same. Hence, bank profit must be higher.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)(D − (1− γ)L)
1 + µ . (B.50)
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Take the derivative w.r.t. iR to get[






− D − (1− γ)L1 + µ +
























′′(L) +H ′(L) < 0, and
[






> 0. Also,∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] may be positive or negative. Hence, the overall
effect is ambiguous.
Case IIIA






(1 + µ). (B.52)
Then a marginal increase in iR has no effect on L or D. Since rB is given by






− γ(1− γ)β , (B.53)
it will also remain unchanged. However, since iR is larger, profit will be higher. Finally, since D and L
remain unchanged, a higher iR lowers the default probability.
Case IIIB















= 1 + i
R
1 + µ +
γ
(1− γ)β . (B.55)
Hence, L will decrease while D remains unchanged. Since rB = 1+i
R
1+µ , it will increase.
Similar to Case IIB, since iR is higher, bank profit is higher even if bank’s assets and liabilities remain
the same. Hence, bank profit must be higher.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)(D − (1− γ)L)
1 + µ . (B.56)
Take the derivative w.r.t. iR to get
− D − (1− γ)L1 + µ +

















< 0. In addition, by Lemma B.1 we have∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] < E[LH ′(L, s) +H(L, s)] = LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0,
Hence, default probability will decrease. 
Proof of Proposition 5.4: We consider the effects of a marginal increase in δ in all five cases.
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Case I
In this case, the FOCs are
L
N






rD′(D) = 1− δ
β
+ δ(1 + i
R)
1 + µ . (B.59)




β . Since r
B = 1/β, it is unaffected
by the increase in δ.





















Since banks could have chosen a higher reserve ratio if it was profit maximizing, bank profit must decrease.
Case IIA
In this case, we have D = ((1− γ)L+ b)/(1− δ) and
L
N
H ′(L) +H(L) + (1− γ)δ(1 + i
R)






















H ′(L) +H(L)− γ
β
]
+ (1− γ)δ(1 + i
R)
1 + µ . (B.62)
Note that in Case IIA,






− γ(1− γ)β >
1 + iR
1 + µ . (B.63)
Hence, increasing δ will make the right-hand side of (B.62) smaller and the left-hand side larger. This means
that L must decrease. The effect on D, however, is ambiguous. Since L will decrease, rB will increase.



















If rB remains unchanged, then a higher δ will lower bank profit because banks could have chosen a higher
reserve ratio if it was profit maximizing. However, rB is also higher. Hence, the overall effect on bank profit
is ambiguous.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)δD
1 + µ + br
B . (B.65)
Take the derivative w.r.t. δ to get[










− (1 + i
R)D




























′′(L)+H ′(L) < 0, and Dr̂D′(D)+ r̂D(D)− (1+i
R)δ




H(L, s)] dG(s)+G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ)+H(L, ŝ)] may be positive or negative. Hence, the overall effect is ambiguous.
Case IIB
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In this case, because reserve requirement does not bind, a marginal increase in δ has no effect on L or D.
Since rB = 1+i
R
1+µ , it is unaffected by the increase in δ. Similarly, bank profit and default probability are not
affected either.
Case IIIA






(1 + µ). (B.67)
Then increasing δ will decrease L but have no effect on D. Since L will decrease, rB will increase. Similar
to Case IIA, the higher rB will increase bank profit while the higher δ will decrease bank profit. Hence, the
overall effect is ambiguous.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)δD
1 + µ + br
B . (B.68)
Take the derivative w.r.t. δ to get
− (1 + i
R)D























Note that ∂L∂δ < 0. In addition, by Lemma B.1 we have∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] < E[LH ′(L, s) +H(L, s)] = LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0,
Hence, default probability will decrease.
Case IIIB
Similar to Case IIB, because reserve requirement does not bind, a marginal increase in δ has no effect on L
or D. Since rB = 1+i
R
1+µ , it is unaffected by the increase in δ. Similarly, bank profit and default probability
are not affected either. 
Proof of Proposition 5.5: We consider the effects of a marginal increase in γ in all five cases.
Case I
In this case, because capital requirement does not bind, a marginal increase in γ has not effects on L or D.
Since rB = 1/β, it is unaffected by the increase in γ. Similarly, bank profit is not affected either.
Case IIA
In this case, we have D = ((1− γ)L+ b)/(1− δ) and
L
N
H ′(L) +H(L) + (1− γ)δ(1 + i
R)




















− δ(1− γ)(1 + i
R)


















rD′(D) + 1N r














































′(L) + LNH ′′(L) +H ′(L)
] (B.73)
Note that rD(D)+ DN r
D′(D) < 1−δβ +
δ(1+iR)
1+µ in Case IIA. Hence,
∂D
∂γ < 0. As for
∂L




f(D) = rD(D) + D
N















1−σ N − σN + σ
N − σN
1 + (ε− 1)σ
1− σ , (B.74)
where ε = 1− b/[(1− δ)D]. It is easy to see that f ′(D) > 0. Note also that in Case IIA, D > D† where D†
solves rD(D) = 11+µ Hence, f(D) ≥ f(D
†), which is given by
f(D†) = 11 + µ
N − σN + σ
N − σN
1 + (ε− 1)σ
1− σ . (B.75)
Then, f(D) > 1/β as long as 1+(ε−1)σ(1+µ)(1−σ) >
1
β . In such case, we have
∂L
∂γ > 0. Since r
B is given by






− γ(1− γ)β , (B.76)
rB will decrease.



















If rB remains unchanged, then a higher δ will lower bank profit because banks could have chosen a higher
reserve ratio if it was profit maximizing. If L increases, then rB will be lower. Hence, bank profit must
decrease.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)δD
1 + µ + br
B . (B.78)
Take the derivative w.r.t. γ to get[


































′′(L) +H ′(L) < 0, and Dr̂D′(D) + r̂D(D)− (1+i
R)δ
1+µ > 0. However,∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] may be positive or negative. Hence, the overall
effect is ambiguous.
Case IIB
In this case, the FOCs are
rD(D) + D
N
rD′(D) = 1 + i
R









= 1 + i
R
1 + µ +
γ
(1− γ)β . (B.81)
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Hence, L will decrease while D remains unchanged. Since rB = 1+i
R
1+µ , it is unaffected by the increase in γ.
Bank profit is given by
− E


















Since banks could have raised more equity if it is profit maximizing, bank profit must decrease.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)(D − (1− γ)L)
1 + µ . (B.83)
Take the derivative w.r.t. γ to get
− (1 + i
R)L
1 + µ +















Note that ∂L∂δ < 0. In addition, by Lemma B.1 we have∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] < E[LH ′(L, s) +H(L, s)] = LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0,
Hence, default probability will decrease.
Case IIIA






(1 + µ). (B.85)
Then L will increase while D remains unchanged. Banks raise equity and invest them in loans. Since rB is
given by






− γ(1− γ)β , (B.86)
it is decreasing in both L and γ. Hence, rB will decrease following an increase in γ. Hence, bank profit will
also decrease.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)δD
1 + µ + br
B . (B.87)



























′′(L) +H ′(L) < 0. In addition, by Lemma B.1 we have∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] < E[LH ′(L, s) +H(L, s)] = LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0,
Hence, default probability will increase.
Case IIIB
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= 1 + i
R
1 + µ +
γ
(1− γ)β . (B.90)
Hence, L will decrease while D remains unchanged. Since rB = 1+i
R
1+µ , it is unaffected by the increase in γ.
Similar to Case IIB, because banks could have raised more equity if it is profit maximizing, bank profit
must decrease.




LH(L, s) dG(s) +G(ŝ)LH(L, ŝ) + (1 + i
R)(D − (1− γ)L)
1 + µ . (B.91)
Take the derivative w.r.t. γ to get
− (1 + i
R)L
1 + µ +















Note that ∂L∂δ < 0. In addition, by Lemma B.1 we have∫ s̄
ŝ
[LHL(L, s) +H(L, s)] dG(s) +G(ŝ)[LHL(L, ŝ) +H(L, ŝ)] < E[LH ′(L, s) +H(L, s)] = LH ′(L) +H(L) < 0,
Hence, default probability will decrease. 
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